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Technology Transfer Rules: 
A Study in Comparative Law 
by William Sprague Barnes· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rules which govern contracts for the transfer of technology between 
Latin America and the developed countries of North America and Europe are 
complicated by the fact that both transferor and transferee nations legislate 
them and frequently enact significant changes in the legislation.! 
In Latin America, as governments seek to eliminate those clauses which 
restrict the power of the recipient to take full advantage of the technology that 
has been acquired, contracts for technology transfer have come under 
scrutiny. Legislation enacted in Mexico,2 Brazil,' Chile,· Argentina,5 the 
• Henry J. Braker Professor of International Commercial Law, The fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, Tufts Univenity. Professor Barnes is the author of numerous books and articles. 
I. For example, there was a trend toward strict rules in the recipient countries which are now 
being modified and, there is a trend toward greater scrutiny of such transfers in the major trans-
feror countries, especially in Europe and Japan. See TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: LAw AND PRAc-
TICE IN LATIN AMERICA, IX (B. Carl ed. 1918) [hereinafter cited as Carl]: "[I]fthe results are un-
satisfactory, the terms of the offer can be revised. The 1911 statutes of both Chile and Argentina 
represent such modification." ld. Several methods of transferring technology exist. They include 
individual experts, contracts for the supply of machinery, turnkey contracts and technology licen-
sing agreements. UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (UNIDO), 
GUIDELINES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 8-9 
(1913) [hereinafter cited as UNIDO GUIDELINES]. This article focuses on the use of technology 
licensing agreements. Such agreements have traditionally been advantageous to the licensor. D. 
GoULET, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE: VALUE CONFLICTS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 56-60 
(1911). 
2. Registro de la Transferencia de Technologia (Mexican Law on the Registration of the 
Transfer of Technology and the Use and the Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks) [Mexican 
Technology Transfer Law], Law of Dec. 28, 1912, (1912) D.O., Dec. 30, 1912 (Mex.), translaud 
in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 421 (1913). Set also Mexican Law on Inventions and Trademarks, 
Law of February 8,1976, [1976] D.O., February 10, 1916 (Mex.). The former statute became ef-
fective on January 29, 1913. Hyde & de la Corte, Mexico's New Transfer of Ttchrwlpgyand Foreign In-
IJIStmmt Laws - To What Exlmt Have the Rules Changed? 10 INT'L LAw. 231 (1916) [hereinafter 
cited as Hyde & de la Corte]. 
3. Law No. 5,112 (Industrial Property Code of 1971), Law of Dec. 21, 1911, (1911]1 Colecao 
190 (Braz.), has been augmented by the Acto Normativo (Normative Act), No. IS, Law of Sept. 
11, 1915, [1975] Revita da Propriedade Industrial No. 256 (Sept. 16, 1915). 
4. Decree-law No. 600, Law of March 18, 1911, D1ARIO OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA (July 13, 
1974) (Chile), translated in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 134 (1978), was enacted by the Chilean 
Legislature shortly after Chile's withdrawal from ANCOM. It modified a 1974 Decree Law 
governing foreign investment. Wesley, Chile, in Carl, supra note I, at 135-36, 281-82 [hereinafter 
cited as Wesley]. 
5. The 1914 Argentine Law on Transfer of Technology, Law of Sept. 21, 1914, (1974 Argen-
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Philippines,6 Venezuela,7 and the Andean Groups was originally inspired by 
United States and European efforts to control restrictive business practices 
and to maintain competition. However, the motivation for the Latin 
American regulation of these contracts is the protection of nationals of the less 
developed countries from onerous provisions in international contracts with 
corporations from the developed countries. It is an oversimplification to ex-
plain the rules governing technology transfer contracts in Latin America today 
in terms of economic nationalism. Royalty payments to foreign licensors are 
subject to a deep-rooted distrust and result from a perceived. inferiority of 
bargaining position. 9 Moreover, what may well be sensible provisions for 
tine Law), (1974) A Anuario No. 20.794 (Arg.), reprinted in 14 INDUS. PROP. 338 (1975); Law No. 
21.617, Law of Aug. 12,1977 (Arg.), reprinted in Carl, supra note 1, app. G, was implemented by 
Decree No. 1885 of Aug. 15, 1977, BUL. OF. (Aug. 8, 1978), reprinted in 60 BOLETIN DE INFOR-
MACION LEGAL 10-11 (1978). These are in line with the proposals of the Group of 77. See, e.g., 
Dessemontet, Transfer of Technology under UNCTAD and EEC Draft Codifications: A Eurpoean View on 
Choice of Law in Licensing, 12 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 1, 10 n.30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
Dessemontet ). 
6. The three principal laws in the Philippines on foreign investment are: 1) R.A. No. 5186 (In-
vestment Incentives Act), Law of Sept. 16, 1967 (Phil.); 2) R.A. No. 5455 (Foreign Business 
Regulation Act), Law of Aug. 15, 1968 (Phil.); and 3) R.A. No. 6135 (Export Incentives Act), 
Law of Aug. 31, 1970 (Phil.). These are discussed in Hilado, The Legal and Administrative Regulation 
of Transfer of Technology: The Philippine Setting, 51 PHIL. L. J. 69, 93 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Hilado). On December 14,1977, Presidential Decree No. 1263 entitled "Amending Portions of 
Republic Act No. 165 Otherwise Known as the Patent Law" was signed. /d. at 93. This decree 
established a foreign technology licensing code very similar to the UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), Draft Texts Submitted to the Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, Annex II 
(Revised Text of Draft Outline of an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology: 
Submitted on 'Behalf of the Experts from the Group of 77), U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/9 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Group of 77 Draft), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 462 (1978). The 7th 
Plenary meeting of the United Nations Conference on an International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology has resulted in a slightly altered version although the draft remains 
substantially the same. See UNCTAD, Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of 
Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/9; UNCTAD, Documents of the Conference, U.N. 
Doc. TD/CODE TOT/10. 
7. Decree 746 of Feb. 11, 1975, in 11 DER. DE LA INTERGRACION 318 (1975), contains signifi-
cant restrictions on technology agreements. Decree 2442 of Nov. 8, 1977, arts. 63-73, GAC. OF .. 
Nov. 15, 1977, No.2, 100 Ex. further restricts such agreements. See Pate, Present and Future 
Venezuela Technology Policies: Implementation and Implications for Technology Suppliers and Foreign In-
vestors, 9 LAw AM. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Pate). 
8. The basic law on technology transfer and patents as well as the general problem of foreign 
investment is Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Common Regime of 
Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties, [Decision 
24), Law of Dec. 31, 1970, (1971) R.O. No. 264, at 1 (Ecuador), translated in 11 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS 126 (1972), as amended, translated in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977). Decision 84 on 
the Basis for a Subregional Technological Policy, 1974, GRUPO ANDINO, Sep. No. 28, at 1-11 
(June, 1974), translated in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1478 (1974), established the basis for transfer 
of technology in the region. Decision 85 on Industrial Property, 1974, GRUPO ANDINO, Sep. No. 
28, at 11-12 (June, 1974), translated in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1489 (1974), approved the Regula-
tion for the Application of Rules on Industrial Property. 
9. See Wesley, supra note 4, at 132, where reference is made to a lack of sophistication in 
negotiations and an inability to assimilate foreign technology in Chile. 
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maintaining competition and assuring a free market in developed countries of 
Europe, North America and Japan, have been used as the basis for a series of 
measures which could inhibit the technological development and economic 
growth of Latin American countries. 10 The systematic licensing of technology 
to controlled local subsidiaries by U. S. firms is justified by a centralized inter-
national finance function which requires the optimal channels of fund flows. II 
This article will compare the technology transfer provisions for the Latin 
American countries with the United States and European antitrust provisions 
applicable to licensing agreements. The draft Code of Conduct formulated by 
the Pugwash Conferences and sponsored by United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Developmentl2 will be discussed as a basis for evaluating the extent 
to which the Latin American national legislation has fulfilled the goals and 
purposes enumerated in the United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCT AD) documents. 
First, the article sets out and examines the four basic alternative sets of rules 
to govern the transfer oftechnology: the applicable U.S. antitrust law, the ap-
plicable European antitrust law, the various Latin American national licens-
ing regulations, and the international efforts to formulate a Code of Conduct 
regulating technology transfer. 13 Business spokesmen have criticized binding 
Hi. One example of this is the unbundling approach. Nattier examines the unbundling ap-
proach in Brazil: 
"An initial prescription is that transactions containing elements that fall within several 
categories must be covered by separate contracts; that is, a single agreement may not cover a 
patent license, a transfer of proprietary know-how and a trademark license. Rather, these must 
be three separate agreements." Nattier, Brazil, in Carl, supra note I, at 145, 156. 
For other examples of unbundling, see Group of 77 Draft, supra note 6, chs. 3.2(vi), 4.2(12), 
reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 467. On trademarks in Brazil, see Daniel, Guidelinesfor 
Trtulerno.rk License Agreements and Transfer of Technology in Brazil, 73 PAT. & T.M. REV. 83 (1975), 
which states that "the maximum royalty permitted for a trademark license agreement is 1 % of 
the net sales of the products which are identified by the trademark. " /d. at 87. 
11. Wesley, supra note 4, at 133, refers to this as a common practice, considered an abuse 
which is eliminated by Decision 24, Law of Dec. 31, 1970, [1970] R.O. No. 264, at art. 20, as 
arnnuUd, translated in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 138. In March 1977, Chile enacted Decree-Law 
No. 600, Law of March 18, 1977 (Chile), translated in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 134 (1978), 
withdrawing from the Andean Pact and removing the requirements of approval of technology 
transfer where total value is less than 5 million U.S. dollars, or in sectors re~erved to the state or 
public services or licenses made by a foreign state. Wesley cites other examples of the trend 
toward liberalization in Chile. Wesley, supra note 4, at 137. 
12. UNCTAD, Report of the Working Group on Code of Conduct of Transfer of Technology 
of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.llL.12 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as the Pugwash Code]. 
13. For background information on all three topics in summary form in one specific area, see 
Silverstein, Sharing United States Energy Technology with Less-Developed Countries: A Model for Interna-
tional Technology Transfer, 12 J. INT'L LAw & EcON. 363, 379-96 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Silverstein]. A thorough analysis of the international efforts is available in Finnegan, A Code of 
Conduct Regulating International Technology Transfer: Panacea or PitJall~, HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. 
REV. 57, 67-87 (Inaugural Issue, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Finnegan]. The study, prepared by 
Eduardo White of INTAL and published by UNCTAD, is the most complete source on Latin 
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governmental regulations as counterproductive,l+ but that specific study is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
Second, it will focus on the specific attempts of less developed countries and 
international organizations to regulate, or that have been proposed to 
regulate, international licensing agreements. After discussing the substantive 
nature of these various rules and the practices they are directed at, the author 
concludes that the Latin American nations will urge the adoption of the Group 
of 77 Draft International Code of Conduct for the international regulation of 
technology transfer as a legally binding instrument in both regional and global 
forums as soon as possible. 
II. THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
A. United States View 
The U.S. Governmentl5 is not willing to recognize proprietary rights In 
American rules. UNCTAD, Control of Restrictive Business Practices in Latin America, U.N. 
Doc. ST/MD/4 GE. 75-45034, at 53-105 [hereinafter cited as Restrictive Business Practices]. An 
earlier publication of the Council of the Americas, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND GEOGRAPHIC 
PERSPECTIVE (R. Driscoll and H. Wallander eds. 1974), covers the history of UNCTAD and 
other international efforts as well as the efforts of Mexico, the Andean Group, Brazil and Argen-
tina. A background paper for a seminar in June 1977 updates the Council of the Americas work. 
Kantor, Restrictive Business Practice in Latin America, (unpublished seminar paper, June, 
1977) (copy in author's possession). The literature in this field is expanding rapidly both in 
Europe and in Latin America, in German, French, and Spanish language journals. The two most 
useful sources for all developments are the BoLETIN DE INFORMACION LEGAL DEL INT AL and 
DER. DE LA INTEGRACION which have published comparative studies on technology transfer rules. 
No effort is made here to cover a related set of issues, namely, whether the U.S. and foreign 
policies operate as constraints or incentives to technology transfer. Four such issues are trade and 
export controls, financing and insurance policies, antitrust, and taxation. 4 PUBLIC POLICY AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 353-510 (Fund for Multinational Management Education, Council of 
the Americas, U. S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce & George Washington 
Universityeds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as PuBLIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER]. For ex-
ample, substantial tax disincentives are encountered in both the U.S. and foreign countries. Id. 
at 382. However, for an excellent general overview of the policy implications of technology 
transfers comparing corporate strategies 'and purchaser group objectives, see Baranson, Policy Im-
plications of Teckrwlogy-SMring Trends, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE MULTINATIONALS: CORPORATE 
STRATEGIES IN A CHANGING WORLD EcONOMY 143-63 (ed. 1978). 
14. The results of a questionnaire on key issues in technology transfer administered by the In-
ternational Management and Development Institute (IMDI) are published in INTERNATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, FINAL REPORT ON ScIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND 
DEVEWPMENT (1979). Approximately 90% of the respondents thought that national legislation 
by both home-and-host~country governments and the idea of a binding international Code of 
Conduct were as a rule counterproductive, whereas nonbinding guidelines were considered con-' 
structive by 73% of the group. Id. at 12. 
15. In the United States, and more recently in Europe, there has been a running battle be-
tween 'the innovative private company that invests heavily in research and development (R&D) to 
keep ahead of its competition, and the government which regulates more and more business ac-
tivity. That battle is most vociferous in the area of inventions, patents, know-how, trade secrets, 
trademarks, and copyrights of training manuals, industrial designs and models all of which are 
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know-howl6 which are not patentable, because they are not property and 
therefore not protected by lawY However, the licensee of a patent,1s trade-
mark,19 or copyrighted design20 will not be satisfied nor will he produce effi-
ciently without the guarantee of know-how. 21 As long as licensing agreements 
were predominantly concerned with rights to use a patent or other industrial 
able to be licensed in an international technology transfer. For a worthy discussion of the present 
state of European patent and licensing attitudes and a few cogent remarks on the difference be-
tween the EEC and the U.S. approaches, see Ehrenhaft, A Common Law Lawyer Looks at the Common 
Market's New Patent Licensing Regulation, 12 INT'L LAw. 741 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Ehrenhaft). If a company has substantial contract work with the government, the government 
uses its leverage to force the private company to disclose proprietary information. Obviously the 
enormous investment in R&D and emphasis on innovation has to be justified by some reasonable 
return in the form of royalties from patent licensing and know-how agreements. See Case, Mar-
thinsen, & Moss, Trade Secrecy and Patents (unpublished manuscript, 1978) (copy in authors' 
possession), in which the authors stress the changes in patent licensing which government con-
trols have forced on private industry. 
16. "[T)echnology or know-how denoted the sum of knowledge, experience and skills 
necessary for manufacturing a product or products and for establishing an enterprise for this pur-
pose." UNIDO GUIDELINES, supra note I, at 1-2; see World Intellectual Property Organization, 
Legal Aspects of License Agrennen/S, .in UNIDO GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 49 [hereinafter cited as 
WIPO). Know-how has been defined to include "inventions, processes, formulae, or designs 
which are either unpatented or unpatentable; it may be evidenced by some form of physical mat-
ter, such as blueprints, specifications, or drawings; ... and it may involve accumulated 
technical experience and skills which can best, or perhaps only, be communicated through the 
medium of personal services." Creed & Bangs, Know-How Licensing & Capital Gains, 4 PAT., 
T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. RESEARCH & Eouc. 93 (1960). 
17. "So far as the unpatented know-how element is concerned, no proprietary rights exist in 
respect of which a 'license' in its true sense could be granted." WIPO, supra note 16, at 50. What 
U.S. law does protect is copyrights, trademarks, patents, and certain categories of know-how. See 
Reeves, Antitrust and Internalional Technology Licensing: A Primer, 11 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 262 
(1978): 
The law of copyrights guards the uniqueness of a written or performed creative work. 
The law of trademarks protects the distinctive way a product or service is identified and 
distinguished through the use of a symbol or mark. The Jaw of patents safeguards in-
ventions that meet sufficient statutory and constitutional standards of novelty, utility 
and nonobviousness. Know-how, often referred to as trade secrets, protects technical 
knowledge, experience and skills that are most effectively transferred either by a writing 
or by observation of the actual performance of those possessing such knowledge, ex-
perience, and skills. 
/d. at 266. 
18. The term 'patent' refers to the "exclusive right, granted under the law, relating to the ex-
ploitation of a technical invention." WIPO, supra note 16, at 49. 
19. A trademark "is a visible sign, protected by an exclusive right granted under the law, 
which serves to distinguish goods of one enterprise from those of other enterprises." /d. For 
various definitions of trademark, see Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Heraeus Engelhard Vacuum, 
Inc., 395 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934 (1968); Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 
F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968). 
20. A copyright is a legal grant which secures to an author the exclusive right to his writings. 
See Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. §S I, 4 (1976). 
21. "If a party who must spend large amounts of that money to create this property has no 
protection of the results from that expenditure, then the money will not be spent and society will 
be deprived of its values." Arnold, Goldstein & Nation, An Overview of u.s. Antitrust & Misuse Law 
for Licensors & Licensees in PATENT ANTITRUST 1978, at 311, 393 (1978). 
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or intellectual property, the rules on know-how were subsumed as ancillary to 
the principal thrust of the contract. But as patents run out or become 
unobtainable because the particular process lacks the required level of inven-
tion, the multinational firm may find more and more of its overseas contracts 
involving only know-how. This also may be due to the nature of the foreign 
demand, where local manufacturers seek only the technical knowledge 
necessary to construct the plant and put it on-stream. 
International legal protection and licensing of know-how first developed on 
the assumption that it was a form of industrial property. 22 As between licensor 
and licensee, something of value is transferred for consideration and there is a 
valid contract binding the parties. But in Lear v. Adkins,23 the U.S. Supreme 
Court, adhering to the principle of free access to knowledge,2. imposed narrow 
limits on monopoly which' 'cannot be frustrated by private agreements ... ' '25 
Contracts to license unpatentable know-how and trade secrets are unenforce-
able in the federal courts of the United States because such contracts are dis-
tinguished from the licensing of protected industrial property such as patents, 
trademarks, and copyrights. 26 The dictum in Lear27 was the basis for holding 
that federal patent law requires an inventor to submit his ideas to the Patent 
Office before he can compel payment for the use of his idea. 28 
In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the legitimate interests of 
licensors in executing binding contracts providing know-how and trade secrets 
22. III S.P. LADES, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNA· 
TIONAL PROTECTION 1624 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LADESj. 
23. 395 U.S. 653 (1968). 
24. "Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are balanced 
against the important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas 
which are in reality a part of the public domain." /d. at 670. 
25. /d. at 677. See also Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), holding unenforceable a con-
tract to pay a royalty after the patent had expired. 
26. Root, The Validity of Transnational Technical Know-How Licensing Agreements in the United SlIltes 
Courts, 2 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 128 (1971). Following the decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting Co., Inc., 376 U.S. 
234 (1964), the Supreme Court held that states could not employ unfair competition laws to pro-
tect industrial designs which were not patented or copyrighted because this area was pre-empted 
by federal law under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, d. 2. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). In Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), the Supreme Court 
applied the reasoning of Sears and Compeo to hold that a patentee could not rely on state contract 
law as the basis for collecting royalties under a patent licensing agreement after the underlying 
patent had been declared invalid. /d. at 662. . 
27. Id. at 677. 
28. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D. N.Y. 1970), reo'd, 442 F.2d 
216 (2d Cir. 1971). The first suggestion that the Supreme Court was prepared to retreat from the 
hard line taken in Sears and Compeo came in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). Gold-
stein raised the question of whether a state could prevent the duplication of sound recordings 
which, prior to the Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), were 
not incompatible. In this area, the Court determined that it would not imply a Congressional in-
tent to pre-empt the field absent specific provisions to the contrary. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 
567-70. 
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for a payment by the licensee. 29 The opinion of the majority fails to clarify the 
status of international technology transfer agreements, although it differen-
tiates between patent rights and trade secret rights. 30 Whether the latter are 
truly proprietary rights is still in doubt, since the enforcement of such rights 
depends on the private law of contracts rather than the public grant of a patent 
or other form of industrial property. 
However, the Department of Justice has attempted to give guidance con-
cerning antitrust implications of international agreements by publishing a set 
of guidelines.3! Since know-how licensing lacks any statutory protection,32 
know-how licenses, according to the Department, will generally be subject to 
stricter antitrust standards than those applied to patent licenses. 33 
United States courts have tended to permit moderate restraints of trade 
when a legitimate business objective is pursued, i.e. transfer of technology, 
only if the restraint is reasonably ancillary to this main purpose. 34 "This in-
volves a balancing of the anticompetitive effects of the restraint . . . against 
the business considerations which are alleged to justify the arrangement. "35 
B. The European View 
In the European Economic Community, the rules on competition are set 
forth in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 36 These provisions, mod-
eled after sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,37 prohibit agreements that af-
fect, prevent, restrict or distort competition within the Common Market. 38 
Any agreements "prohibited pursuant to [Article 85 (1)] shall be automatical-
ly void"39 unless exempted by Article 85(3).40 However, only a small number 
29. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) held that states could enforce trade 
secrets through state law since Congress has left the area unattended. /d. at 478-79. 
30. /d. at 471. At present it is estimated that licenses on unpatented know-how account for ap-
proximately 98% of all technology transfer to LOC's. Dessemontet, supra note 5, at 14. 
31. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, (Antitrust Division), Antitrust Guide for International Operations 
Uan. 26, 1977), reprinted in 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (1979) [herein-
after cited as Antitrust Guide]. 
32. See note 16 supra. 
33. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 31. 
34. United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 
175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
35. Antitrust Guide, supra note 31, at 168. 
36. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 
11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome]. 
37. Finnegan & Zotter, The U.s. Antitrust Laws: The Philosophical and Practical Foundations For 
Foreign Antitrust Systems, in PATENT ANTITRUST 1978, at 105, 109 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fin-
negan and Zotter]. 
38. Treaty of Rome, supra note 36, art. 85(1). 
39. /d. art. 85(3). 
40. [d. art. 85(3). 
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of cases in the 1960's and early 1970's have dealt with the relationship of the 
Treaty of Rome to licensing agreements. U 
Despite the spate of cases in the European Community, there is presently a 
desire to encourage the transfer of technology and the conclusion of licensing 
agreements, rather than regulations which specify a long list of prohibited 
clauses. 42 
However, there has been an attempt by the EEC Commission to formulate 
specific guidelines for certain types of patent licensing agreements. U The 
latest formulation lists practices considered automatically exempt from the 
proscribed conduct of Article 85( 1 ). H The basis for this list is that "those ar-
rangements which, although they may violate Art. 85(1), nevertheless may be 
held to benefit the public interest. "f5 Therefore, even though not yet in force, 
these guidelines are a valuable tool for predicting the Commission's attitude 
with respect to specific clauses and provisions. Thus, we can assume that even 
a relatively mild control of licensing agreements will not be accepted in 
Europe. 
In Europe, as in the United States, the courts have attacked patent licensing 
which includes schemes to restrain trade and eliminate competition. A series 
of cases in the U.S. federal courtsf6 1ed the Department of Justice to scrutinize 
international technology licensing agreements for possible anti-competitive ef-
fects,f? whereas the European cases have tended to protect the licensee. f8 
The purpose of this scrutiny is to keep firms from monopolizing the innova-
tions which they have worked so hard and spent so much to develop. f9 If a sub-
41. E.g., Re the Agreement of Burroughs AG and Etablissements L., (1972) J.O. No. L 
13/50, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 067 (1972); Re the Agreements of the Davidson Rubber Co., 
(1972)].0. No. L 143/1, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D52 (1972); Re the Agreement between Kabel-
und Metallwerke Neumeyer A.G. and Les EtablissementsLuchaire S.A., (1975) J.O. No. L 
222/34, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 040 (1975); Association Des Ouvriers en Instruments de Precision 
(A.O.I.P.) v. Berard, (1976)].0. No. L 6/8,17 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D14 (1976). 
42. See Finnegan & Zotter, supra note 37, at 109; Basset, EEC Group Exemption for Patent 
Li&mses, 6 INT'L Bus. LAw. 226 (1978); seea/so Ehrenhaft, supra note 15, at 741-43,747,755 for a 
list of the clauses, a recommended list of deleted topics, and a critique of the draft. 
43. Finnegan & Zotter, supra note 37, at Appendix C. 
44. /d. In addition to those enumerated as exempt or "white" clauses in Article 1, an equal 
number of practices in Article 2 are unavailable for automatic exempti.on and might therefore be 
construed as a list of prohibited practices or "black" clauses under Article 85. /d. 
45. /d. Even in its revised form, the EEC Draft Regulation which evolved from EEC Regula-
tion 19/65 is not likely to be accepted. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 15, at 743. 
46. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593.(1951); United States v. Na-
tional Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); United States v. Imperial Chemical In-
dustries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
47. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 31. 
48. For insight into the current status of EEC law and the European Court's approach to 
handling patent licensing cases involving restrictive clauses, see Association Des Ouvriers en In-
strumentsde Precision (A.O.l.P.)v. Beyard, (1976)].0. No. L6/8, 17Comm. Mkt. L. R. D14 
(1976). 
49. The license may encounter antitrust obstacles if it contains restrictions which are 
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stitute technology is not available at an equivalent cost, the government steps 
in to investigate the possibility of anticompetitive practices. Whether this 
scrutiny will become more severe as firms turn to trade secrets and know-how 
agreements remains to be seen. Eventually government intervention becomes 
counterproductive, since firms encountering too much regulation often with-
draw into the safety of undisclosed trade secrets. "If trade secret protection is 
more attractive from a business point of view than patent protection, it is not 
hard to imagine a group of firms ... excluding competitors without access to 
the secret and forever preventing the knowledge from passing into the pubic 
domain. "50 
C. General Discussion: Interests of Host and Home Countries 
In general terms, the home country restricts the licensor as to the type of 
property rights and the conditions under which such rights can be transferred. 
The host country simultaneously restricts the form or amount of payment and 
other conditions which can be demanded of the licensee. Both countries may 
be involved in the case of a breach of contract and either licensor or licensee 
may be liable for damages. Legal hazards arise in both countries and affect 
both parties. 
Licensors tend to be in a stronger bargaining position to dictate the terms, 
especially if their position is economically superior to the licensee. As a result 
of the inequalities of bargaining power, legislation has established greater 
not reasonably adapted to securing for the patentee rewards ancillary to the 
grant, or if the license is used to provide the patentee with powers exceeding 
those inherent in the original grant. Since benefit is the primary motivation for 
the patent law, a license which tends to impede implementation of those ends by 
restraining trade will be subject to antitrust scrutiny. 
16G J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS S 59.06(IXa) (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
VON KALINOWSKI). 
Areas subject to scrutiny typically involve package licensing. See American Security Co. v. Shat-
terproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), em. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959) (mandatory 
package licensing); but if. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) 
(arranged for convenience of both parties). For field-of-use restrictions, see General Talking Pictures 
Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938) (field-of-use restrictions approved); Benger 
Labs, Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.Pa. 1962), aif'd, 317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963) (proper to license one company for human lield and another for 
the veterinary field). For quantity restrictions, see American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Building 
Material Co., 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1934); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 
(S.D. N.Y. 1945), aif'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947). For restrictions on resale, see Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 
(17 Wall.) 453 (1873) (exhaustion of patent by first sale); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); for tying clauses, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal 
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 
U.S. 495 (1969); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
For price fixing, see United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); United States v. 
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). 
50. Silverstein, supra note 13, at 385. Cj Davidow, U.s. Antitrust Laws and International Transfers 
of Technology - The Government View, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 733 (1975). 
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governmental control and SUpervISIon over contracts, particularly in the 
public services, communication, and extractive industries. To the extent that 
standardized contracts in the licensing field contain or refer to legal rules 
which are detailed and can supplant national laws, there is little left to be 
governed by the proper law of the contract. 
Patents and technology transfer are the most critical instrumentalities by 
which developing nations achieve economic and social goals51 and attain 
equality with the developed nations. 52 As licensees or host countries, develop-
ing nations seek to insure that the specific forms of technology they receive are 
suitable to implement those goals since the "global enterprises will impart 
only such technology as suits their purposes. "53 From the perspective of 
developing nations, it is essential that the bargaining position of the licensees 
of technology from the developing countries be strengthened. 54 One of the 
aims of the national legislation and international drafts is to improve the 
negotiating posture of the licensee as well as to identify and prohibit abusive 
licensing practices. Latin American nations are seeking to put licensees in an 
equal position vis-a-vis the licensor. 
That developing nations are not in an equal position with respect to 
developed countries is demonstrated by the one-sided nature of many licens-
ing agreements. These agreements may represent adhesion contracts. 55 Con-
tracts of adhesion in municipal law results from unequal bargaining power 
and are characterized by lack of knowledge, lack of choice, bargaining inade-
quacy, gross imposition of terms and unconscionable results. 56 
The provisions of many licensing agreements contain a price fixing provi-
51. The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Less-Developed Countries, Report 
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. E/3861/Rev. 1 (1964); Kunz-
Hallstein, Patent Protection, Transfer oj TechnoloO and Developing Countries - A Survey oj the Present 
Situation, 6 INT'L REV. COPYRIGHT & INDUS. PRoP. L. 427-28 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kunz-
Hallstein ]. 
52. Set Office of the Director General of the National Registry for the Transfer of Technology 
(Statement by Counsel), Changing the Rules: International Law and the Developing Countries: The ABA 
Workshops oj 1977, 12 INT'L LAw. 265 (1977): 
The International Community has recognized that technology is a part of the universal 
human heritage and that all countries must have the right to its access in order to im-
prove their standard of living; that transfer of technology can play an effective role in 
the elimination of poverty and economic inequality among countries; and, finally, that 
it can contribute toward the establishment of a new international economic order. 
/d. at 276. 
53. Constantino, Global Enterprises and the Transfer oj Technoloo, 7 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 44, 46 
(1977). 
54. Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 51, at 441-42. 
55. See generally Wilson, Freedom oj Contrfll:t and Adhesion Contrfll:ts, 14 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 172 
(1965). 
56. Se. generally Bolgar, The Contrfll:t oj Adhesion, 20 AM. J. COMPo L. 53 (1972). 
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sion,57 export restrictions,58 tie-in clauses, 59 grant-back provisions60 and a 
royalties clause61 which demonstrate the one-sided nature of the agreement. 
These provisions are illustrative of the inequality of bargaining power62 that 
existed between interests of the licensees and licensors. 
In a comparative survey of these government restrictions on licensing, the 
most liberal will recognize know-how as a fully licensable right that requires 
no registration, where no limits will be placed on the length or term of the 
agreements, and where clauses will be allowed stating that monopoly extends 
beyond the patent, or other industrial property, both in time and space. 63 In 
countries where the balance of payments and availability of foreign exchange 
has improved, the requirements of registration and limits on royalty payments 
are being liberalized. Such liberal countries allow clauses restricting the 
licensee's exports to avoid competition in the licensor's own market. Most of 
the reservations expressed by governmental agencies regarding licensing con-
tracts are concerned with certain industries and with rates of royalties. 64 
III. INTERNATIONAL PROPOSALS FOR RULES OF CONDUCT GOVERNING 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
In order to appreciate the reason for the strong reaction against freedom of 
contract in technology transfer, the UNCTAD reports need to be studied in 
detail. Less than 1 % of all patents issued from 1971 to 1975 were owned in one 
of the developing countries. 65 The approach of the international draft codes 
has been to restrict freedom of contract in technology transfer agreements and 
impose certain restrictions upon the ability of the licensor to dictate the terms 
of a licensing agreement. In its 1975 Report on major issues arising from the 
transfer of technology to developing countries, UNCT AD estimated that these 
nations were paying one-and-a-half million dollars for technology and could 
be paying nine million dollars by the end of the 1970'S.66 
57. See Iti(J VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 49, S 59.06 [l][c][i); see also 16 VON KALINOWSKI, 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS SS 6.02 [2][a), 6.02 [3][b) (1979). The most thorough definition of 
price-fixing made by the courts is found in United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 
150 (1940). 
58. 16G VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 49, S 59.06 [l][a][ii). 
59. Id. S 59.06 [1][a][iii), 6.02 [a][b), 6.02 [3][c). 
60. Id. S 59.03 [3][a). 
61. 14 H. EINHORN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS S 3.01 (T. Costner ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited 
as EINHORN). 
62. See Macaulay v. Schroeder Publishing Co. Ltd., [1974)1 W.L.R. 1308, 1316 (H.L.). 
63. See H. COHEN-JEHORAM, THE PROTECTION OF KNOW-How IN 13 COUNTRIES 14-164 
(1977). 
64. See, e.g., Law of Aug. 12, 1977, [1977) OF. GAZ. (Aug. 16, 1977) (Arg.), reprinUd in 49 
BoLETIN DE INFORMACION LEGAL 1-3 (1977). 
65. Mangalo, Palen/ Prouc/ion and Technology Transfer, 9 INT'L REV. COPYRIGHT & INDUS. PROP. 
L. 100, 111 n.46 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mangalo). 
66. The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, 
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The reports led to a declaration which called for a revision of the Paris Con-
vention on Industrial Property67 to fulfill the following objectives: 
1. The industrial property system can serve as a useful tool for facili-
tating transfer of technology to developing countries if the inter-
national standards are adapted to the economic, social and 
political conditions and national development objectives of 
developing countries and if they do not constrain in any way the 
flexibility of each country to adapt its laws and practices to its 
own needs. 
2. The immediate and continuing task of the system should be to 
provide, in the shortest time possible, the broadest available 
technical assistance to help developing countries to strengthen 
their scientific and technical infrastructures and to train their 
specialists. 
3. The international standards should reflect the historical and 
economic changes which have taken place, and the new trends in 
national legislation and practices of developing countries 
(whether or not they are members of the Paris Union). 
Developing countries have sought to acquire technology to assist their 
economic development through various international forums, relying upon 
emerging sources of international law . 
These new sources of international law of foreign investments and 
technology transfer include the resolutions and drafts of the United Nations 
General Assembly,68 United Nations Industrial Development Organization,69 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)/o 
Report Prepared Jointly by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the 
UNCTAD Secretariat, and the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, U.N. Doc. TD/B/A.C. 11/19, at 20-29 (April 23, 1974). 
67. Convention for the Protection oflndustrial Property, revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 
21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention). 
68. E.g., Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. 
Res. 3201, 6 U.N. GAOR, Special Supp. (No.1), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974)[hereinafter cited as 
Declaration); Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order, G.A. Res. 3202, U.N. GAOR, Special Supp. (No.1), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Programme); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G .A. Res. 
3281,29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Charter). 
69. On the. importance of patents and transfer of technology, see International Centre for In-
dustrial Studies (UNIDO), Functions and Organization of National Offices for Transfer of 
Technology, U.N. Doc. ID/WG.228/3 (1976); Ma,ngalo, supra note 65, at 118. 
70. Since 1974, a group of experts has been addressing itself to the problems of technology 
transfer in the developing countries and a revision of the Paris Convention. See UNCTAD, The 
Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. 
TD/B/AC.11119 (1974); Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 51. UNCTAD reports deny the advantage of 
an international patent system for the development of the LDC's and call for a revision of na-
tional patent laws as well as relevant international agreements. 
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World Intellectual Property Organization (WIP0)11 and the contemporary 
practice of states. 72 
A. The Charter oj Economic Rights and Duties of States 
The Charter of Economic Rightnmd Duties of States73 called for the estab-
lishment of a new international economic order based on sovereign equality 
and the interdependence of the developed and developing countries. 74 It was 
promulgated in response to the urgent need to establish or improve norms of 
universal application for the development of international economic relations 
on a just and equitable basis. 75 The Charter seeks the promotion of the 
economic and social progress of the entire international community. Article 13 
of the Charter recognizes the need of developing states to acquire technology 
and the need to acquire it "in accordance with procedures which are suited to 
their economies. "76 
B. The Resolutions oj the New Economic Order 
Article 4(p) of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order asserts that the developing countries should have access to 
technology through technology transfer,17 Article (e) of the Declaration calls 
for: 
(e) Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural 
resources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these 
rescources, each State is entided to exercise effective control over 
them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own transfer of 
ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full 
permanent sovereignty of the State. 78 
In addition, section IV of the Program of Action on the establishment of a 
New International Economic Order reiterates these concepts and calls for 
developing nations "(d) to adapt commercial practices governing transfer of 
technology to the requirements of the developing countries .... ' '79 
71. In February 1975, The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) met in Geneva 
and issued a draft of revision of the Paris Convention on 14 basic issues questioning the very 
heart of the Paris Convention. Second Session of the WIPO Permanent Technical-Legal Pro· 
gram for the Acquisition by Developing Countries of Technology Related to Industrial Property 
at Geneva, March 17-21, 1975, WIPO Doc. AT/PC/1I/12 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WIPO 
Report]. 
72. Set notes 2-8 supra. 
73. Charter, supra note 68. 
74. /d. preamble. 
75. /d. 
76. Id. art. 13. 
77. Declaration, supra note 68. 
78. /d. 
79. Programme, supra note 68. 
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C. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Activities 
The aim of UNCT AD efforts has been to lessen the negative effects on de-
veloping countries that arise from patent protection and to assure their access 
to technology under fair and equitable cpnditions. 8o Since 1974, groups of ex-
perts have implemented these aims by producing a Code of Conduct8! and a 
revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as 
revised at' Stockholm, 1967 (hereinafter Paris Convention).82 In 1970 the 
General Assembly accepted these goals in its adoption of the International 
Development Strategy. 83 Among other provisions, these sources of law reject 
the concept of national treatment of foreigners. 84 
D. The Activities of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
Non-recognition by developing countries of the concept of national treat-
ment is central to the revisions of the Paris Convention proposed by WIPO:85 
Their fourteen point working paper eliminates "the very basis principle of na-
tional treatment of foreigners" and identifies thirteen other problems with the 
Paris Convention. 86 
80. C. OKOLIE, LEGAL AsPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES vi (1975) [hereinafter cited as OKOLlE]. 
81. UNCTAD is working on an international code of conduct for the transfer of technology. 
See UNCTAD, Draft Texts Submitted to the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an Inter-
national Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, Annex I (Tentative Composite Draft Text 
of the Proposed International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology), U.N. Doc. 
TD/AC.1I9 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Composite Draft], reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 
453 (1978). The Trade and Development Board's Committee on the Transfer of Technology has 
established an Intergovernmental Group of Experts to Prepare the Code of Conduct. Several 
outline drafts have been prepared, including one by the developing countries, Group of 77 Draft, 
supra note 6; and one by the developed countries, UNCTAD, Draft Texts Submitted to the In-
tergovernmental Group of Experts on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of 
Technology, Annex III (Revised Outline of a Code of Conduct Consisting of Guidelines for the 
International Transfer of Technology), U.N. Doc. TD/AC.I/9 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
Group B Draft], reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 473 (1978). The most recent session of the 
United Nations Conference on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology 
has resulted in a slightly altered version although it remains substantially the same. UNCTAD, 
Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE 
TOT/9, and UNCTAD, Documents of the Conference, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/I0. "The 
substance of the 77 Outline, which incorporates radical departures from the traditional concepts 
followed in international licensing practice is likely to be issued by UNCTAD as the finalized 
code of conduct. ... " Dessemontet, supra note 5, at 1-2. 
82. Paris Convention, supra note 67; Mangalo, supra note 65, at 116. 
83. OKOLlE, supra note 80. 
84. Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 51, at 428; Mangalo, supra note 65, at 116. 
85. WIPO Report, supra note 71, ISSUE 1. 
86. [d. The Fourteen Points for revision of~he Paris Convention, supra note 67, include: 
1. The Principle of National Treatment. 
2. The Principle of Independence of Patents for the Same Invention Granted in Dif-
ferent Countries. 
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E. UNCTAD and Attempts at Model Legislation 
It is obvious that the rules governing technology transfer in the countries in-
volved will be of importance in any contract to license or otherwise transfer 
industrial property and know-how from one country to another. The most re-
cent trends and developments go beyond the analysis of existing home and 
host country legislation to the introduction of model legislation based on a 
comparative study of the laws governing technology transfer. This work was 
inspired by the work of Eduardo White87 and other Latin American experts, 88 
and has developed in a series of so-called Pugwash Conferences on Science 
and World Affairs sponsored by the United Nations. 89 The guidelines of the 
OECD which were advanced at the Pugwash Conference on Science and 
World Affairs did not attempt to achieve a set of rules governing international 
transactions, but rather sought to set a standard to be utilized by ea~h country 
as a yardstick for its own policy. 
The conference, held in Geneva in April 1974, produced a working group 
report which recommended a Code of Conduct on the transfer of 
technology.90 During the last few years, especially at the UNCT AD IV Con-
ference in Nairobi in May 1976, the intergovernmental group of experts has 
been drafting similar codes of conduct for the transfer of technology.91 It is 
not possible here to point out all the differences between the OECD Recom-
mendations and the Group B draft, since they identify clauses which are con-
sidered as restrictive business practices.92 The OECD-sponsored draft differs 
3. Working Requirements. 
4. Grace Period. 
5. Licenses of Right. 
6. Grant of Preferential Treatment to Developing Countries Without Reciprocity. 
7. Technical Assistance. 
8. Type of Protection Other than Patents. 
9. Trademarks, Industrial Designs, and Appellations of Origin. 
10. Reservations. 
11. Deletion of the Colonial Clause. 
12. Scope of Protection of Process Patents. 
13. Right of Priority. 
14. Principle of Unanimity. 
Note 71 supra. See Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 51, at 430-31. 
87. E.g., Restrictive Business Practices, supra note 13. 
88. See, e.g., Aracama, EI tkTedw de las Palmtes en America LatitUI EsltuJa actual y perspectivdSfuturdS, 
in 9 DER. DE LA INTEGRACI6N 75 (1971); Caedenas & Pena, Los acuertios subregiorw.lesy el tralfJdo de 
Montevideo, in 2 DER. DE LA INTEGRACI6N 10 (1968). 
89. Pugwash Code, supra note 12. See also Finnegan, supra note 13, at 67. 
90. Pugwash Code, supra note 12. 
91. See, e.g., Composite Draft, supra note 81. 
92. For an excellent and thorough analysis of the supplier guarantees in the Group of 77 Draft 
Code and the relationship to the Group B Code, Set Comment, The Group of 77 Draft Provisions 
Concerning Supplier Guarantees for the Proposed In/ertUltiorw.1 Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, 9 
GA. J. INT'L L. 69 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Group of 77 Draft Provisions Concerning Supplier 
Guarantees) . 
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from the others in that it only identifies a limited number of categories of such 
practices. 
Article 5.1 of the Group of 77 draft details nine specific guarantees93 which 
must be made by technology suppliers. Article 5.1 reads: 
The enterprise supplying technology shall guarantee that: 
1. The technology acquired is suitable for the manufacture of prod-
ucts covered by the arrangement; 
2. The content of the technology transferred is full and complete for 
the purposes of the ~angement; 
3. The technology obtained will be capable of achieving a predeter-
mined level of production under the conditions specified in the 
agreement; 
4. National personnel shall be adequately trained for service in the 
recipient country in the knowledge of the technology to be ac-
quired including operation and management techniques ofthe 
enterprises; 
5. The recipient shall have access to all improvements upon the 
techniques in question during the lifetime of the arrangement; 
6. Where the recipient of the technology has no other alternative 
than acquiring capital goods, intermediate inputs and/or raw 
material from the technology supplier or any other enterprise 
designated by him, the prices of the articles shall not be higher 
than current international price levels; 
7. Where the recipient of the technology has no other alternative 
than selling his output to the technology supplier or any other 
enterprise designated by him, the prices of the article shall not be 
lower than current international price levels; 
8. Spare parts, components and other requirements necessary for 
using the imported technology shall, if required by the recipient, 
be provided for a specified period of time and without additional 
charges for maintaining this guarantee; 
9. The technology suppliers, while drawing up the design specifica-
tion of plants, will take fully into account the possibility of utiliz-
ing locally available resources. . 
In contrast, the OECD draft suggests that these guarantees should be pro-
vided whereas the Group of 77 uses the term shall. 94 This reflects a fundamen-
tally variant approach to the code. The former group wishes to have a volun-
tary code ~ith the tenor of the OECD guidelines. The latter set of countries 
demands that the code be mandatory and legally binding. Seymour Rubin 
points out three problems in defining the legal nature of the Code, one of 
93. Group of 77 Draft, supra note 6, ch. 5.1, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 468. 
94. Group B Draft, supra note 81, ch. 2.1, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 475; Group of 
77 Draft, supra note 6, Preamble, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 463. 
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which is precisely as stated above, i.e., whether it will be binding or merely 
persuasive. 95 In addition, he asks whether it will be addressed to governments 
or to the parties involved in the transactions. Finally, he questions the means 
by which the code will become effective: through national legislation or inter-
national law. However, it is of the utmost importance to realize that, whatever 
the answers to these quesitons may be, some form of regulation is necessary in 
the international technology arena. 96 The formulation of a Code through the 
instruments of the U. N. may be the only, albeit slow, means of accomplishing 
this goal. 
IV. THE LATIN AMERICAN VIEW 
Several countries in Latin America have established legislation for control 
of restrictive business practices in international licensing. Argentina97 and 
Mexic098 have special laws, while Brazil99 has incorporated such rules into the 
law of industrial property. The central objective common to all of them is to 
control the monopoly or oligopoly power of foreign licensors. The laws classify 
various types of restrictive clauses, including such typical restrictions as ter-
ritorial limitations, tie-in sales, price fixing, and other vertical restrictions. 
The method of control is usually to require the registration of all international 
license agreements. IOO The control methods follow three approaches: (1) ab-
solute prohibition, (2) prohibition except in specific instances, and (3) optional 
prohibition at the discretion of the competent authorities. IOI Considerable 
pressure has been applied to eliminate or modify particular practices in exist-
ing and new international licensing agreements, especially through the power 
of competent authorities to refuse registration. lo2 
These laws are not founded on a strong anti-trust or anti-monopoly tradi-
tion such as existed in the United States, but stem from efforts to regulate 
foreign investment. In Latin America, as in Europe before the successful 
establishment of the European Common Market, the government did not 
believe in competition as an effective means of maintaining fair prices and 
95. Rubin, Reflections Concerning the U. N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, 70 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 73 (1976). 
96. Group of 77 Draft Provisions Concerning Supplin Guarantees, supra note 92, at 104-06. 
97. See note 5 supra. 
98. See note 2 supra. 
99. See note 3 supra. 
100. See, e.g., Mexican Technology Transfer Law, Law of Dec. 28, 1972, [1972] D.O. Dec. 
30, 1972, art. 7 (Mex.), transillted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 423-24. 
101. For a discussion of the control methods and their underlying rationale, set J. ALVAREZ-
SoBERANIS, THE NEED FOR THE FORMATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 14-15 (1977). Sr. A1varez-Soberanis was the Director General of the 
Mexican Register of the Transfer of Technology. /d. at 1. 
102. Set, t.g., Mexican Technology Transfer Law, Law of Dec. 28,1972, [1972] D.O. Dec. 
28, 1972, arts 2-7 (Mex.), transillted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 422-24. 
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self-regulation of economic activity through market forces. Only in the last 
decade has any significant effort been made to regulate international licensing 
agreements. 
As a result of working together in the past few years, the Latin Americans 
adhere to three principles that they have always had in common: first, state in-
tervention, even to the extent of strengthening negotiations by making the 
government a party or a protector oflocal enterprises with a view to increasing 
their bargaining power; 103 second, registration of the contract with the possi-
bility of approval or disapproval; and third, specific control of the clauses in 
licensing agreements. The latter impose obligations on the recipient which are 
not directly connected with the object of the agreement or, those which affect 
his power of decision and subject him to domination by the transferring enter-
prise. 
Most of the Latin American codes provide that registration will be denied if 
unacceptable provisions are included or mandatory guarantees are omitted. 104 
The following analysis of the principal prohibited clauses and guarantees does 
not attempt to cover all of these provisions in the Latin American countries. 
For the purpose of comparison, a few of the most controversial or significant 
can be considered. 105 In addition to the Latin American initiative which has 
sparked the UNCT AD Code of Conduct there is resentment against many 
current practices in the field of licensing. For example, the Latin American 
proposals are intended to curtail protection of unpatented know-how and 
trade secrets, to shorten the patent protection period and to require working of 
local patents. In addition, they propose to allow export of products manufac-
tured using the technology that has been licensed and, to require greater dis-
closure in patents so that it is not necessary to obtain commercial and technical 
know-how in order to take advantage of the invention which they have ac-
quired the right to use under the patent license. ~ 
The outstanding difference between U.S. law and the Mexican rules is the 
requirement of compulsory registration of all license agreements with the na-
tional registry for the transfer of technology .106 Typical of all of the Latin 
American legislation, if the agreement is not registered within the time that it 
is prescribed under the law, the agreement will be unenforceable and illegal in 
103. Set text accompanying note 62 supra. 
104. See, t.g., Mexican Technology Transfer Law, Law of Dec. 28, 1972, (1972] D.O. Dec. 
30, 1972, art. 7 (Mex.), translated in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 423-24. 
105. Set The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Coun-
tries, Report Prepared Jointly by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Af-
fairs, the UNCTAD Secretariat, and the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, U.N. Doc. TD/B.AC.11/19 (Rev. I), at 28-29 (1975). See also FenIow, World-Wide 
Licensing Challenges, 1974 PAT. L. ANN. lIS, 131-34, which summarizes the most important provi-
sions of the Latin American laws. 
106. THE LAw AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING (M. Finnegan & R. Goldscheider eds. 1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Finnegan & Goldscheider]. 
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Mexico. 107 United States law is completely different, since there is no require-
ment that agreements be registered with any government agency.l68 "In the 
United States agreements are considered private agreements and may be kept 
secret between the companies unless there is a dispute between the licensor 
and the licensee that would cause the agreement to come before a court ad-
judicating the dispute. "109 The differences between the Mexican and U.S. 
laws are significant and are reflected in the objectives of the Mexican 
technology transfer law and those of U.S. antitrust laws. 110 In the case of the 
United States, the laws are intended to insure free and open competition be-
tween companies operating in the same market. 111 Conversely, Mexican and 
other Latin American technology transfer laws are designed to help develop-
ing countries control the type, quality and price of technology that is intro-
duced. 112 Therefore, the registration requirement in these countries is 
necessary to obtain detailed information concerning what technology is actu-
ally being transferred, how much is being paid for it, and whether it is in the 
national interest to allow it to be introduced on those terms. The licensing re-
strictions, or clauses of licensing contracts that are declared illegal in Mexico, 
are based directly on the same legal philosophy under which U. S. antitrust law 
prevents a licensor from requiring a licensee to accept conditions which he 
does not want to accept.1I3 Licensors in the U. S. and Europe increasingly are 
becoming accustomed to the application of antitrust laws to licensing 
agreements. Consequently, licensors are learning to live with stricter regula-
tions. 
Latin American legislation clearly condemns as illegal any requirement that 
the licensee should provide the licensor or the property with any improve-
ments made in the licensed technology. 11. In the United States, it is still legal 
107. See note 104 supra. 
108. Finnegan & Goldscheider, supra note 106, at 84. 
109. ]d. 
110. The purpose ofthe antitrust laws is to maintain free competition in interstate and foreign 
commerce. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); United 
States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U.S. 61,66 (1912) ("to preserve from undue restraint the 
free action of competition in interstate commerce. "); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 
288 U.S. 344 (1932). "The general objective ofthe antitrust laws is promotion c>f competition in 
open markets." THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAws 1 (1955). 
111. A clear manifestation of this idea is the requisite showing of 'relevant market' in many 
antitrust cases. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. E.l. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,393 (1956)(" Illegal power must be appraised in terms 
of the competitive market for the product"); Times-Picuyone Publishing Co. v. United States, 
345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1943). 
112. See notes 2-8 supra. 
113. See generally EINHORN, supra note 61, at U 7.01-.09. 
114. E.g., Mexican Technology Transfer Law, Law of Dec. 28, 1972, (1972) D.O. Dec. 30, 
1972, art. 7, §§ IV, V, translated in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 423. 
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for licensors to require licensees to give such rights, at least to a non-exclusive 
license of any improvements or inventions made by the licensee.1l5 In some 
cases the licensor would agree to pay a royalty for the grant-back. It is doubt-
ful that Latin American legislation could be interpreted to suggest that the 
licensor is free to require the licensee to grant a non-exclusive license to im-
provements. 
Another example of the Latin American legislation includes a prohibition 
against the licensor placing limitations on export of goods or services produced 
under the license. 116 This provision is considered especially onerous by U.S. 
licensors, since there is no equivalent provision in U.S. or European antitrust 
law. 117 Territorial restrictions are permitted if they are reasonable in scope 
and duration; where a licensor has already given an exclusive license for one 
territory, it would be difficult to allow a Latin American licensee to export into 
the exclusive licensee's market, yet there appears to be an almost absolute pro-
hibition in some countries. Similarly, to the extent that Latin American 
legislation prohibits the licensor from limiting the volume of production under 
the license, it is more strict than U. S. laws which permit such a provision if it 
is reasonable. 11s 
In Argentina, the registration of technology transfer contracts required by 
Law No. 21.617 of August 12, 1977,119 has been modified by Law No. 21.879 
of September 19, 1978. 120 Contracts between a foreign-owned local company 
and the company which directly or indirectly owns it may be approved if they 
can be considered as being made between independent enterprises. But pay-
ment of trademark royalties betWeen those companies was not allowed, and 
any payments between them had to be justified annually. 121 Now fixed 
amounts are to be allowed in cases of technical services from abroad, repairs, 
115. Silverstein, supra note 13, at 382. The grant-back clause is a covenant by a licensee to 
disclose to the licensor any improvements pertaining to the licensed technology. The principal 
argument against grant-back clauses, especially those providing for a royalty-free assignment, is 
that they stifle research and development activities by patent licensees because only the licensor 
stands to profit from any significant innovations. In the case of Transparent Wrap Mach. Corp. 
v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947), the Supreme Court held that such clauses are not per 
se violations of the U.S. antitrust law. 
116. See, e.g., Mexican Technology Transfer Law, Law of Dec. 28, 1972 (1972) D.O. Dec. 30, 
1972, art. 7, S VII, translated in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 424. 
117. See The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. SS I, 2 (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. U 14,18,19 
(1976); Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 13e, 13c-13f; Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 
U .S.C. S 45 (1976); Treaty of Rome, supra note 36, arts. 85-86. 
118. See text accompanying note 34 supra. 
119. Law No. 21.617, Law of Aug. 12, 1977 (Arg.), reprinted in Carl, supra note I, app. G, was 
implemented by Decree No. 1885 of Aug. 15, 1977, BUL. OF. (Aug. 8, 1978), reprinted in 60 
BoLETIN DE INFORMACI6N LEGAL 10-11 (1978). 
120. Law No. 21.879, Law of Sept. 19, 1978 (Arg.), reprinted in 61 BOLETIN DE INFORMACI6N 
LEGAL 9 (1978). 
121. 1974 Argentine Law, (1974) A Anuario No. 20.794 (Arg.), reprinted in 14 INDUS. PROP. at 
338. 
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emergencies, and personnel training. 122 This represents a further liberaliza-
tion of the technology transfer rules of Argentina. 
V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRADE RESTRAINTS 
The Group of 77 Code is intended to become a legally binding instru-
ment,123 whereas the OECD draft is offered simply as a guideline. m In any 
event, the comparison between the restrictive business practices singled out 
for comment in the international efforts and those in the United States, 
Europe, and Latin America are striking in their similarity. For example, a 
clause which requires the licensee to acquire materials, parts, or products for 
use with the licensed technology only from the licensor, is generally illegal 
under U.S. antitrust laws125 and is also absolutely prohibited in the interna-
tional technology transfer draft codes. 126 
Although the Group of 77 Code spells out 40 different types of unacceptable 
provisions,127 there are five offensive clauses which are particularly worthy of 
comparison. 
1. Price Fixing: Clauses or practices whereby the supplier of tech-
nology reserves the right to fix the sale or resale price of the prod-
ucts manufactured. 128 
The unacceptable clause in the OECD draft is the one which sets the price, 
quantity or output within the licensee's territory.129 In both the United States 
and Europe, price fixing is considered contrary to public policy. In Latin 
America it is absolutely prohibited. 130 
2. Export Restrictions: Clauses or practices prohibiting or limiting 
in any way the export of products manufactured under the li-
censed technology or a requirement of prior approval of the licen-
122. See note 120 supra. 
123. Group of 77 Draft.. supra note 6, Preamble, repn'nted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 463. 
124. Group B Draft, supra note 81, ch. 2.1, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 475. 
125. See Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 448 F.2d 
872 (2d Cir. 1971), etrl. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972). See also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); International Business Machines Corp. v. 
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). 
126. Composite Draft, supra note 81, ch. 4, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 459; Group 
of 77 Draft, supra note 6, ch. 4.2(12), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 467; Group B Draft, 
supra note 81, ch. 5.1(xi), 'reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 476. 
127. Group of 77 Draft, supra note 6, ch. 4, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 466-69. 
128. See note 57 supra. 
129. Group B Draft, supra note 81, ch. 4.2(20), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 468. 
130. See Decision 24, Law of Dec. 31, 1971, (1971] R.O. No. 264, arts. 20b, 25c, as amended, 
translated in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 146-48. Law No. 21,617, Law of Aug. 12, 1977 (Arg.), 
art. 10(i), reprinted in Carl, supra note 1, Appendix G. It is also prohibited by the Mexican 
Technology Transfer Law, Law of Dec. 30, 1972, (1972) D.O. Dec. 28, 1972 (Mex.), art. 7 (XI), 
translaled in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 424. But there is no reference to price fixing in the law of 
Brazil. However, the National Institute for Industrial Property (INPI) has power to control price 
fixing clauses. 
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sor for exports are prohibited except in justifiable Circum-
stances. 131 
In the OECD draft, unreasonable restnctlOns preventing export of the 
patented products to specified areas are proscribed. 132 This is in accordance 
with, for example, Japanese FTC guidelines which quite sensibly provide that 
export restrictions may be considered unfair business practices except where: 
1) the licensor has patent rights in a territory which the licensee is restricted 
from exporting to or; 2) where the licensor is already selling the licensed prod-
uct in the restricted area under his normal business practice or; 3) finally 
where the licensor has already granted an exclusive license to a third party to 
sell in a restricted area. 133 The absolute restriction of such clauses is difficult to 
achieve in any legislation, although the laws of Mexico and the Andean Group 
do not allow so much flexibility as the Japanese rule cited above. For example, 
in the Andean Group export restrictions are only allowed in exceptional cases 
duly justified before the competent authority. 134 
In the United States and Europe, export restrictions are only prohibited 
where unreasonable, and much of the case law in both jurisdictions centers on 
defining the nature of the reasonableness of the restriction. 135 It is obvious that 
export restrictions can only be imposed on the licensee, since it would be 
beyond the scope of his property rights in the technology for him to attempt to 
restrict the buyer. But one must be careful to distinguish between patent 
license agreements in which export restrictions are likely to be scrutinized 
carefully and know-how contracts or trade secret transfers which are not sub-
ject to the limitations of industrial property law. 
3. Tie-in Clauses: Clauses which restrict the sources of supply of 
raw materials, spare parts, intermediate products, and capital 
goods. Such a clause is considered to be unacceptable under the 
various international draft codes. 136 
The OECD Draft is precise in prohibiting clauses which oblige the licensee 
to obtain goods from a designated source or to sell to the licensor.137 Quality 
control may require or justify some reasonable tie-in of supplies or capital 
131. See note 58 supra. 
132. Group B Draft, supra note 81, ch. 5.1 (XII), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
478-79. 
133. See Finnegan, supra note 13, at 53 n.52. These guidelines are reprinted in Finnegan & 
Zotter, supra note 37, at 195-98. 
134. Decision 24, Law of Dec. 31, 1970, (1970) R.O. No. 264, art. 20(b), as amended, translated 
in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 146. For I/- discussion ofthe application of Decision 24 in Columbia 
and Venezuela, see Pate, The Andean Common Marlcet, in Carl, supra note 1, at 59 [hereinafter cited 
as The Andean Common Market). 
135. United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. III. 1956); 
Etablissements Consten S.A. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH. v. E.E.C. Commission, [1966] 
D.S. Jur. 429, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418 (1966). 
136. See note 47 supra. 
137. Group of 77 Draft, supra note 81, ch. 5.1 (XI), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 478. 
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goods. Therefore, it may be necessary to allow some exceptions to the general 
rule. Tie-in clauses which are unacceptable in regard to licensed industrial 
property may well be permissible, if not necessary, in the case of licensing of 
trade secrets and know-how. 138 
The clauses which impose obligations to purchase equipment are not ab-
solutely prohibited in Argentinal39 or Brazil, 1+0 and are allowed in Mexico1+1 if 
the goods cannot be purchased on more favorable terms elsewhere. In the An-
dean Code and in other Latin American countries, the mandatory purchase of 
tie-in goods is permitted only when the prices correspond to world market 
prices. In the Latin American view, all clauses which oblige the licensee to do 
business with the licensor or use his distribution channels are prohibited on the 
basis that they put too great a limitation on the rights of licensee. Similarly, a 
requirement that the licensee sell exclusively to the licensor at a price estab-
lished by the licensor is absolutely prohibited. 1+2 
It is interesting to note that the Latin American legislation includes grant-
back clauses in the general category oftie-ins, rather than as a separate class of 
restrictions. This is also true of clauses which restrict the use of other 
technologies which are absolutely prohibited in the Andean Code.l+] The 
policy of the Brazilian authorities is to allow such restrictions if the prohibition 
applies only for the duration of the contract.l44 
4. Unilateral Grant-Back Provisions: Unilateral grant-back provi-
sions call for a flow of technology from the recipient without 
reciprocal obligations by the supplier and a requirement that all 
new technologies, patents, and improvements developed by the 
technology recipient shall be the property of the licensor.1t5 Such 
grant-back clauses have been prohibited in the international 
drafts. 
In the Group of 77 Draft exclusive grant-backs are prohibited, and then 
only if there is no reciprocal obligation imposed upon the technology 
supplier .1+6 The OECD Draft prohibits a requirement that the licensee assign 
an exclusive grant-back to the licensor of all improvements discovered, but the 
assumption is that it is a restrictive business practice only if it amounts to an 
138. Se, LADES, supra note 22. 
139. Radway and Giacchino, Argentina, in Carl, supra note 1, at 224. 
140. Nattier, Brazil, in Carl, supra note 1, at 157. 
141. Hyde & De La Corte, MlJCi&o, in Carl, supra note 1, at 27-28. 
142. Se. generally Restrictive Business Practices, supra note 13. 
143. Decision ::4, Law of Dec. 31, 1970, [1970] R.O. No. 264, art. 20(d), 4Sammded, translaJ,d 
in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 146. See generally The Andean Common Market, supra note 134. 
144. For an in depth discussion of the Brazilian regulations, se, Nattier, Brazil, in Carl, supra 
note 1. 
145. Se, note 48 supra. 
146. Group of 77 Draft, supra note 6, ch. 4.2(4), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 466. 
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abuse of the dominant position of the licensor. 147 In the United States and 
Europe, a non-exclusive grant-back clause is not a violation of the competition 
policy, us and one assumes that most transferors of trade secrets or know-how 
would be able to enforce a contract which required that all improvements be 
transmitted to the licensor. 
5. Royalties Clauses: Objectionable royalties clauses, those which 
have restrictions that would have effect beyond the duration of 
the contract, are those which are most difficult to assess. U9 
In cases where the licensee undertakes not to contest the validity of the sup-
plier's patents or if a clause restricts the use of the patented or any unpatented 
know-how which relates to the working of a patent after the patent has ex-
pired, international drafts would find such clauses unenforceable and not 
justifiable. Any effort to collect royalties on patents after they have expired is 
unenforceable under U.S. patent law: 150 A clause in which the licensee agreed 
not to challenge the validity of the licensor's patent was prohibited by the 
United States Supreme Court and in Europe. lsl 
It would seem that the real purpose of prohibiting the continuation of re-
strictions on use after expiration of agreement in the international drafts as 
well as in the Latin American countries is based on the desire not to be subject 
to limitations of excessive duration. In the Latin American legislation there 
does not seem to be any rule which states that restrictions may not be imposed 
on the use of the matter licensed after the termination of the contract. 
However, in the administrative practice of most of the countries, it has been 
established that once the contract is expired no limitations can be enforced. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Legislation has been enacted in the Andean Group, the Philippines, 
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela which facilitates their access to the 
technology of developed countries. Additionally, some of this legislation con-
147. Group B Draft, supra note 81, ch. 5.1 (VI), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 478. 
148. A nonexclusive grant-back clause may be legal and enforceable. However, the ultimate 
answer rests on the facts of each case and the determination of whether the clause unreasonably 
restrains trade. See Transparent Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 V.S. 637 (1947). 
149. See note 61 supra. 
150. Post-expiration royalties are per se violations ofthe V.S. antitrust laws. Brulottee v. Thys. 
Co., 379 V.S: 29, 32 (1964). 
151. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 V.S. 653 (1969). 
Surely the equities of. the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are balanced 
against the important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of 
ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain .... If [the licensees) are 
muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists 
without need or justification. 
ld. at 670. See also note 41 supra. 
For an excellent analysis of Lear, see McCarthy, "Unmuzzling" the Patent Licensee: Chaos in the 
Wake of Lear v. Adkins, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1977). 
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tains national ownership requirements and provides for a regulatory regime 
for the transfer of technology through the process of registration. 152 Registra-
tion is generally not allowed where agreements are inconsistent with national 
economic development goals. 153 Through the process of renegotiation, a 
state's new economic laws may be retroactively applied to pre-existing agree-
ments.l54 
In addition to delineating various unacceptable provisions in technology 
licenses, the Group of 77 Draft155 and the Group B Draft156 are both con-
cerned with the subject of guarantees to be made by the supplier, the recipient 
and the recipient country. These guarantees relate to the goal of changing the 
status quo - a status quo which sees the U.S. as the leader of a 'technology 
cartel,' and which is characterized by the multinational corporation using the 
national and international patent system to preserve monopolies and quasi-
monopolies in technology, e. g., particularly through the device of 'defensive' 
registration of patents in the technology receiving states. 157 Some of the basic 
changes necessary to challenge this status quo include (a) the unpackaging of 
technology transfers; (b) the prevention of abuse of dominant position of 
technology suppliers; (c) the development of technological capability in recip-
ient countries; (d) assurance of effective performance of technology transfer 
agreements; (e) national regulation of technology agreements by recipient 
countries; and (1) equitable dispute settlement mechanisms.158 It is obvious 
from this list that some of the restrictive clauses address similar problems; 
however, none provides a comprehensive approach. 
In comparing European, United States and Latin American rules on the 
rights of a licensor to dictate the terms of his licensing agreement, the draft 
Regulations of the EEC are the most lenient, the U.S. more stringent, but still 
allowing some autonomy; and the Latin American national legislation is the 
152. Venezuela, under Decree 746 as extended by Decree No. 1285, previously registered 
contracts had to be submitted for approval and renegotiated to conform to the regulations. Fail· 
ure to conform might result in their cancellation. Pate, supra note 7, at 9. In Mexico pre·existing 
agreements were required to be submitted to the Ministry within 90 days of the Technology Law 
until January 29, 1975. Hyde & de la Corte, supra note 2, at 235. Those agreements not 
registered are without legal effect and will not be enforced in the courts. Mexican Technology 
Transfer Law, Law of Dec. 28,1972, (1972) D.O. Dec. 30,1972 (Mex.), art. 6, translated in 12 
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 424. 
153. See, e.g., Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 5, at 435; Mangalo, supra note 65. See also, Restrictive 
Business Practices, supra note 13. For a discussion of whether the UNCTAD Code of Conduct 
has been successful in responding to the problems of the developing countries, see Comment, 
Regulation of Transfer of Technology: An Evaluation of the UNCTAD Code of Conduct, 18 HARV. INT'L 
L.J. 309 (1977). 
154. See note 152 supra. 
155. Group of 77 Draft, supra note 6, chs. 5.1, 5.2, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
469-70. 
156. Group B Draft, supra note 81, ch. 6.2, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 477-78. 
157. Silverstein, supra note 13, at 385. 
158. /d. at 409-15. 
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strictest. The international draft of the developed OECD nations reflects the 
lenient national regulations of the dominant member states. Conversely, the 
draft of the Group of 77 Draft reflects the stringent national legislation of the 
Latin American states. 159 
This brief review of five of the principal types of rules governing interna-
tional technology transfer contracts and the nine supplier guarantees desired 
by the Group of 77 suggests that there is substantial agreement between the in-
ternational drafts and the legislation of the more advanced Latin American 
countries. It is therefore concluded that the Latin Americans will urge adop-
tion of these draft codes of conduct as legally binding instruments and will at-
tempt to introduce them both on a global and a regional basis in the near 
future. • 
159. E.g., on the issue of choice of law the Group of 77 Draft, supra note 6, has excluded the 
autonomy of the parties to select the governing law by calling for the application of a licensee's 
national law in all contracts related to technology transfers. See Dessemontet, supra note 57, at 
1-2,8. The Mexican Technology Transfer Law, Law of Dec. 28, 1972, (1972] D.O. Dec. 30, 
1972 (Mex.), translated in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 421 (1973), and the 1974 Argentina Law, 
(1974] A Anuario No. 20.794 (Arg.), reprinted in 14 INDUS. PROP. 338 (1975) have incorporated 
the proposals of the Outline of the Group of 77 in adopting legislation which prohibits party 
autonomy. See Dessemontet, supra note 5, at 10. While not widely accepted, there is some prece-
dent for legislation that curtails, the power of two contracting parties to choose applicable law. Ex-
amples of this include Section I ofthe Carriage of Goods By Sea Act (1924-Great Britain). Wyatt, 
Choice of Law in Contract Matters - A QJustion of Policy, 37 MOD. L. REV. 399, 401, 408-09 (1974). 
For an English case applying a choice of law limiting statute, see Coast Lines Ltd. v. Hudig & 
Veder Chartering N.V., (1972)1 All E.R. 451. It is imperative that one realizes the differing 
reasons for restrictions and the dissimilar traditions associated with Western states and the 
developing countries. Western nations generally accept the tenet that the free market place is in-
herently efficient thus, rules are more lax. In contrast, developing countries tend to trust positive 
state intervention in the development process in order to assure quality standards, international 
collaboration and strengthened bargaining positions. See Dessemontet, supra note 5, at 19. 
·(EDITOR'S NOTE: the following postcript to the Latin American Commercial Law Sym-
posium which appeared in Vol. II: 2 of the Review accompanies the final article of that Symposium 
written by Professor William S. Barnes. It was authored by Professor Dale Beck Furnish, who 
was the Chairperson of the Annual Meeting of the Comparative Law Section ofthe Association of 
American Law Schools on January 4 and 5, 1979 held in Chicago. The articles in the Latin 
American Commercial Law Symposium were outgrowths of papers presented at the meeting.) 
The academic life is supposed to be one of thoughtful reflection. It should provide for the 
relatively few lawyers who live in the luxury of time to think all around a problem and to carry it 
to its ultimate implications. The same luxury is denied to the practicing bar, which is sworn to at-' 
tend its clients' needs before its intellectual curiosity, and the courts, which must decide the cases 
thrust before them out of the crush of litigation and appeal. By comparison, the written product 
of jurists dedicated to a life of teaching and research should offer profound insight. All too often it 
is not. All too often scholarship produces only preliminary descriptions of random data rather 
than thoughtful and reflective contributions which enlighten us as to law's impact. The chances 
of encountering description rather than insight and enlightenment are correspondingly higher in 
the field of Comparative Law, where efforts by otherwise competent jurists may be hampered by 
the lack of a fundamental understanding of the sytems that they attempt to analyze. The sym-
posium was a happy exception. It suffers from none of these infirmities. Instead, it should be 
viewed as a late harvest of Latin American legal scholarship ripened in the contemplation of five 
United States jurists over the last decade and more. 
We are all Sisyphus on our individual ~i11s, and too much of our lives is spent in struggling to 
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roll the rock uphill. As Albert Camus noted, however, there are intervals when the rock has rolled 
back to the bottom and the single-minded striver has a short respite for reflection as he strides 
downhill to take up the task again. It appears that such an interval has occurred simultaneously 
for the five authors represented here. 
In the 1960's many United States lawyers went to Latin America. The United States govern-
ment was interested in Latin America and the Alliance for Progress was a vigorous new program. 
There was great interest in the question of law and development. Some lawyers went from the 
United States to Latin America for short periods of time and have long since lost interest. The 
five individuals who contributed to this symposium went for long periods of time, steeped 
themselves in the cultures of the legal systems they studied, and have not lost interest. 
It is good that our authors persevered, although it was not easy. By the late 1960's the Alliance 
for Progress was a moribund program and the number of lawyers going to Latin America began 
to diminish rapidly. The idea of aid for development had not been successful and, while the ques-
tion of the relationship of law to development remains of essential interest, law-and-development 
studies are not supported at anything approaching the level that so awakened interest before. 
It is the strength and the weakness of truly thoughtful study that it cannot be hurried unduly. 
Therefore it is about a decade after the flood-crest of interest has passed that we find the most 
perceptive analyses' emerging. As gold, the most precious metal, sinks to the bottom of a stream 
and remains while lesser elements are swept along, so the lesser elements in the body of learning 
by United States jurists regarding Latin American law have swept through with the main surge of 
interest. For those who were patient enough to maintain their interest, the return is that much 
richer. 
It is comforting to contemplate the knowledge demonstrated in these pages as events turn the 
United States toward Latin America again. Economic events will be the primary focus for the 
renewed interest. It is ironic that programs funded by the United States and its institutions at a 
time when its international trade position seemed so strong may have application as its position in 
the international economy erodes. Inflation was a problem that Latin America had, but the 
United States did not, when Keith Rosenn began studying the ways in which the law responded 
to the problem over ten years ago. The United States' private corporations enjoyed particular 
hegemony as foreign investors in Latin America and determined the extent of technology transfer 
when William Barnes began studying the problem of multinational corporations and the controls 
host countries might place on them. Today the United States must concern itself with controlling 
inflation and the growing influence of foreign investors as well as problems of technology transfer 
in its own economy, while its corporations face increased competition for investments in Latin 
America. The true irony is that the legal system of the United States, which often was carried to 
Latin America as a model of development for Latin Americans, may now draw upon the lessons 
its jurists learned in Latin America to help solve some of its own pressing economic issues. 
The world has changed in the flows of its international trade in the last ten years. The United 
States could once regard its foreign trade as largely insignificant to its economy, but nothing is 
further from the truth today. It is not by chance that the United States has restructured its law 
and institutions of foreign commerce within the last five years. In 1979, the United States was a 
chronic deficit trader. It has a critical and still-growing dependence on foreign commodities and 
manufactured goods. A prime trading partner is Latin America. It is ironic that the programs 
which reached dramatically outward 15 years ago, protesting that they wished not to inflict pater-
nalism but to foster equal participation in seeking development, may now bcndit the closer-to-
equal trade relationships forced upon their sponsor by current events. Many arrangements will 
be made for joint ventures. Michael Gordon has studied these agreements not only in Latin 
America but also in other parts of the world. Likewise Robert Means has studied corporations in 
the commercial history of Colombia and now of Mexico. Thus both authors deal with corporate 
structures and their impact on commercial events, with lessons for the United States and its deal-
ings with Latin America. 
The article that concludes the Latin American Commercial Law Symposium by Professor 
William Barnes has been expanded somewhat from its original focus on technology transfer laws 
in Latin America. In doing so, Professor Barnes has demonstrated his broad knowledge of the 
area of international commercial law. His brief analysis of international and national efforts to 
regulate technology transfer reveals certain similarities in legal developmen ts that demonstrates 
the value of comparative legal studies. 
28 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. III, No. I 
Boris Kozolchyk, who has a first law degree from the University of Havana, a second law 
degree from the University of Miami and a doctorate in law at the University of Michigan under 
the tutelage of Hessel Yntema, is a scholar of both common and civil law systems. Professor 
Kozolchyk has traced the credit structure in Latin America, has been involved in a comprehen-
sive elTort at economic development through the harmonization of law in the Central American 
common market, and has recently examined the concept of fairness as central to the function of 
any system of law in any society. Professor Kozolchyk's path is representative of the process that 
alI of the contributors have gone through to a greater or lesser extent: initial interest, painstaking' 
preparation and study, carefully reduced to written scholarship of major proportions, and finally, 
in those pages, reflection and perspective. 
